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Abstract
We axiomatize a model of decision under objective ambiguity or imprecise
risk. The decision maker forms a subjective (non necessarily additive) belief
about the likelihood of probability distributions and computes the average
expected utility of a given act with respect to this second order belief. We show
that ambiguity aversion like the one revealed by the Ellsberg paradox requires
that second order beliefs be nonadditive. Some special cases of the model are
examined and diﬀerent forms of ambiguity aversion are characterized.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion have become the center of attention in the last
twenty years or so in decision theory. This interest has grown from the challenge
leveled by the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961) against Savage’s Subjective Expected
Utility Model (Savage 1954). The main feature of the Ellsberg paradox is ambiguity
aversion: people tend to choose less ambiguous bets over more ambiguous ones, even
when under certain conditions the ambiguous ones may be more favorable than the
unambiguous ones.
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1Now, ambiguity aversion may be interpreted as a form of pessimism: when favor-
able and unfavorable scenarios (probability distributions on the states of the world)
are compatible with the information available to the decision maker, an ambiguity
averse one will always deem unfavorable scenarios more likely than favorable ones.
However, interpreting ambiguity aversion in this way requires the existence of second
order beliefs, i.e. beliefs over probability distributions. In this paper, we wish to
investigate the conditions under which such second order beliefs exist and how they
interact with information.
1.2 Goal of the paper
The goal of this paper is to axiomatize a decision model under imprecisely known
probabilistic information using second order beliefs in a way compatible with the
Ellsberg paradox. The approach we take to that eﬀect is similar to the approaches of
Wang (2001, revised 2003), Gajdos, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2004), Gajdos, Hayashi,
Tallon, and Vergnaud (2006), Nehring (2002) and Nehring (2001): we assume that
decision makers have preferences on pairs (f,P), where f is an act ` a la Savage
from the set S of states of nature to the set X of outcomes, and P is a set of
probability distributions on S. Consider for instance two Ellsberg urns: the ﬁrst
contains 90 red, blue and yellow balls, among which exactly 30 are red. The other
contains 90 red, blue and yellow balls, among which exactly 30 are red and at least
10 are blue. Would you rather bet on red in the ﬁrst urn or bet on blue in the
second urn? This is the kind of question we assume the decision maker is able to
answer. A more mundane example would be the following: when deciding to design
a policy, a political decision maker can ask experts. If the policy maker is used to
work with a given expert, his or her conﬁdence in the estimates of the expert will be
high, so that he or she will not consider the information provided by the expert as
ambiguous. If, on the other hand, he or she is not very much acquainted with the
expert, the information he or she will deliver will be deemed ambiguous. Now, if
the policy maker has to choose between a policy recommended by the known expert
and a policy recommended by the less known expert, which one should he or she
choose?
If second order beliefs are additive and if reduction of compound lotteries is
allowed, then after the reduction is performed, the decision maker holds additive
ﬁrst order belief; this is incompatible with the Ellsberg paradox. Therefore, there
are two possible ways of dealing with second order beliefs in a way compatible with
ambiguity aversion:
2• Abandon the possibility of reducing of compound lotteries. This is the route
followed by Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), Nau (2006) and Seo
(2006) (see also Rustichini (1992)), as clearly explained in the latter. The
criterion axiomatized in these papers is the following, called Smooth Ambiguity
Model by Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji and Second Order Subjective







u ◦ f dP

dπP(P),
where πP is a probability measure.
• Relax additivity of second order beliefs. This is the route we shall follow. In-
deed, the model we propose is the following: the decision maker forms a sub-
jective prior on the multiple scenarios that are compatible with the available
probabilistic information, P. This prior is a capacity νP, i.e. a monotonic and
normalized (non-necessarily additive) set function. Then, he or she computes






u ◦ f dP

dνP(P),
where the ﬁrst integral is a Choquet integral w.r.t. the capacity νP.
Just as Yaari (1987)’s dual theory of choice under risk is dual to expected utility in
the sense that it transforms probabilities rather than outcomes, our model is dual to
SOSEU in the sense that our ϕ is linear and our πP is non-additive. For this reason
we propose to call this model Second Order Dual Expected Utility (SODEU).
In choosing this alternative route to axiomatizing the natural idea that when a
decision maker faces an imprecise probabilistic information, he or she forms some
prior on the scenarios compatible with this information, we were inspired by a remark
to be found in Chateauneuf, Cohen, and Jaﬀray (2006)1. These authors show how
the Ellsberg paradox for the three-color urn, usually spelled out in terms of Savage
acts, can be recast in the Anscombe-Aumann framework using the composition of the
urn as state space so that it becomes clear that it does not only violate Savage’s Sure
Thing Principle, but also (Anscombe and Aumann 1963)’s Independence Axiom.
The principle of the proof of this point is simple: consider the set S := {R,B,Y } of
states corresponding to the color of the ball and the set of outcomes X = {0,100}.
For a given number k of black balls in the urn, consider Pk the distribution on S
1It seems however that the original idea was Schmeidler’s (personal communication by J.-Y.
Jaﬀray). In a sense it is a kind of folk result, but in this book chapter it is formally proved.
3given by Pk = (1
3, k
90, 60−k
90 ). Consider as well the set P = {Pk | k = 1,...,60}. Now
to each f : S → X, associate the second-order act F f : P → ∆(X), where ∆(X)
is the set of lotteries on X, by letting F f(Pk) = P
f
k , where P
f
k (x) = Pk(f−1(x)). If
E is an event in S, then let fE(s) = 100 if s ∈ E and fE(s) = 0 otherwise. Table I
gives the correspondence between the acts involved in the Ellsberg paradox and the
second order acts that are associated to them.
act consequence on Pk
F R (≈ fR) (0, 60
90 ; 100, 30
90)
F B (≈ fB) (0, 90−k
90 ; 100, k
90)
F {R,Y } (≈ f{R,Y }) (0, k
90 ; 100, 90−k
90 )
F {B,Y } (≈ f{B,Y }) (0, 30
90 ; 100, 60
90)
Table I: The Ellsberg in the Anscombe-Aumann setup
Consider now the act fY. Its corresponding second-order act is deﬁned by
F Y(Pk) = (0, 30+k
90 ; 100, 60−k







{R,Y } + 1
2δ0







{B,Y } + 1
2δ0
on the other, where δ0 is the constant second-order act taking the Dirac at 0 as its
value.
Assuming that F f % F g if and only if f % g, then modal preferences contradict
the independence axiom because of the previous relations.
This suggests that, in order to account for the Ellsberg paradox, the prior on
the scenarios cannot be additive. This should pave the way to the characterization
of various behaviors under uncertainty thanks to the vast literature on the Choquet
integral now available. We provide some examples in the sequel.
41.3 Related literature
We already discussed the relationship of our work with the literature on second-order
beliefs, so we concentrate here on other aspects of the related literature.
The idea of generalizing the notion of risk, i.e. known probability distribution, to
some notion of imprecise risk, i.e. imprecisely known probability distribution, was
introduced by (Jaﬀray 1989), who proposed to replace lotteries by belief functions,
that roughly speaking correspond to sets of lotteries. He obtains a representation in
the spirit of the Arrow-Hurwicz criterion (Arrow and Hurwicz 1972). This idea was
recently revived by several authors who proposed to model imprecise risk directly by
sets of lotteries (Olszewski 2002, revised 2006, Ahn 2003, revised 2005, Stinchcombe
2003): Olszewski also axiomatizes an α-maxmin rule in the spirit of the Arrow-
Hurwicz criterion, while Ahn proposes what can be interpreted in the framework
of sets of lotteries as a conditional version of the SOSEU model, although Ahn’s
theorem works only for sets of lotteries having very speciﬁc topological properties;
Stinchcombe studies various properties of continuous and independent preferences
on the set of lotteries.
As we will show in the sequel, our approach diﬀers from the former approaches
in that we consider pairs (f,P) where f is an act from some state space S to
some outcome space X and P is a set of probability distributions on S, but we
do not assume that the decision maker is indiﬀerent between two acts that induce
the same set of lotteries on X together with P. The idea is that the source of
the set of lotteries matters here. The approach we take originates in the paper
by Wang (2001, revised 2003) that takes as primitives triples (f,P,P ∗) where P ∗
is a reference prior. Wang main result is to provide axiomatic foundations for a
general version of the minimum relative entropy principle of Anderson, Hansen,
and Sargent (1999), but he also characterizes a maxmin rule whereby the decision
maker maximizes the minimum expected utility with respect to the set of objective
priors. This rule is characterized by an axiom of aversion to uncertainty, that is
more an axiom of strong aversion to objective ambiguity, saying that the decision
maker always prefers situations with a more precise objective information (i.e. a
smaller set of priors). In the same setting, Gajdos, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2004)
weaken the notion of aversion to objective ambiguity, what they call aversion to
imprecision, and obtain a generalized maxmin rule whereby the decision maximizes
the minimum expected utility over a subset of the set of initial priors. One special
case of this model is a form of perturbed expected utility, given by the formula
V (f,P,P
∗) = (1 − α)
Z
u ◦ fdP




5a model that was ﬁrst proposed in Ellsberg (1961) in order to rationalize the behavior
described in this paper, and that also appears in Tapking (2004) in the context of the
study of updating rules for capacities. Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2006)
generalize the work done in Gajdos, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2004) by dispensing with
the reference prior, now part of the representation, and providing foundations for
the interpretation of the parameter α as revealing aversion to imprecision. Kopylov
(2006) provides alternative foundations for the perturbed expected utility formula,
characterizing it by an axiom that can be interpreted as a combination of ambiguity
aversion and loss aversion.
? studies a related framework where along with the usual preference relation the
decision maker is endowed with a (potentially incomplete) comparative likelihood
relation, that is assumed to represent the decision maker’s beliefs. The object of in-
vestigation is the compatibility of betting preferences as derived from the preference
relation with the decision maker’s beliefs represented by the comparative likelihood
relation. Aspects of this compatibility will also be studied in this paper.
Finally, Amarante (2006) also studies the functional form that we call here
SODEU. More speciﬁcally, he shows that in the Anscombe-Aumann setup, any
invariant biseparable preference relation can be represented by a Choquet integral
over a set of priors.
1.4 Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the set up and the axioms, in
section 3 the main theorem is stated and interpreted. Section 4 presents important
special cases of the functional. Section 5 studies ambiguity aversion in this setup.
Section 6 contains concluding remarks. Proofs are to be found in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Set Up and Basic Deﬁnitions
The set of states of nature is here denoted S and endowed with a σ-algebra Σ. The
set of outcomes is a measurable space (X,B) where B contains the singletons. We
denote by F the set of simple Savage acts, i.e. the set of ﬁnite-valued measurable
functions f from S to X. Let pc(Σ) be the set of all probability charges (ﬁnitely
additive and normalized set functions) on Σ. Following Nehring (2002), we shall say
that a set P ⊆ pc(Σ) is convex-ranged if for all α ∈ (0,1), for all A ∈ Σ, there exists
B ∈ Σ, B ⊆ A such that P(B) = αP(A) for all P ∈ P. The Lyapunov convexity
6theorem implies that if P is the convex hull of a ﬁnite number of countably additive
non-atomic probability measures, then P is convex-ranged. Nehring (2002) provides
other examples. We denote by P the set of all non-empty convex-ranged subsets P
of pc(Σ).
Following ?, the objects of choice in our setting will be pairs (f,P) in F ×
P. A pair (f,P) of this sort corresponds to a situation where the objectively
given information relevant to act f is consistent with an imprecise probabilistic
representation given by P. We assume here that preferences are expressed over the
set F × P and are represented by the relation %.
2.2 Axioms
We assume the following standard axiom:
Axiom 1 (Weak Order) % is transitive and complete.
Comparisons between two acts accompanied by diﬀerent imprecise information
(f,P) and (g,P0) may seem awkward, but it is in fact very natural: for instance,
when a businessperson is about to sign a contract in a country, the probability of
the contract being enforced depends in particular on the legal system. The less
information the decision maker has about the country, the more imprecise his or
her estimate of this probability based on this information. When one has to choose
between investments in diﬀerent countries, one has therefore to compare similar
decisions in precisely and imprecisely known legal contexts, i.e. under diﬀerent
ambiguous pieces of information.
For f,g ∈ F and A ∈ Σ, the A-graft of f with g, denoted by fAg, is the act
such that fAg(s) = f(s) if s ∈ A and fAg(s) = g(s) if s / ∈ A.
If f ∈ F, denote Σf the algebra generated by f. If F ⊆ F, denote ΣF the
algebra generated by ∪f∈FΣf. Let P ∈ P. Say that A ∈ Σ is independent of F
w.r.t. P, denoted A ⊥P F, if the algebra generated by A is independent of ΣF for
each P ∈ P.
We can now state the continuity axiom we shall use, that roughly says that given
information P, there are always events of suﬃciently small measure w.r.t. to each
prior in P for preferences not to be aﬀected by a modiﬁcation of acts on one of such
events.
Axiom 2 (Information-Contingent Continuity) For all P ∈ P, for all f,g,h ∈ F,
if (f,P)  (g,P)  (h,P) then there exists A,B ∈ Σ, α,β ∈ (0,1) such that:
(i) A ⊥P {f,h}, B ⊥P {f,h};
7(ii) P(A) = α, P(B) = β, for all P ∈ P;
(iii) (fAh,P)  (g,P)  (fBh,P),
In order to state the next axioms, we shall need the following deﬁnition. For any
f ∈ F and P ∈ P(S), we let P f denote the probability measure induced by f on




As f is ﬁnite-valued, P f has ﬁnite support. We let ∆(X) be the set of all ﬁnitely-
supported probability measures or lotteries on X. Then P f ∈ ∆(X).
For any set P ∈ P, any π ∈ ∆(X), let
K(π,P) := {k ∈ F | P
k = π,∀P ∈ P}.
For P ∈ P, let %P be the binary relation deﬁned for all π,π0 ∈ ∆(X) by:
π %P π




In order for this relation to be well-deﬁned, we must impose the following axiom:
Axiom 3 (No Framing Eﬀect) For all π ∈ ∆(X), for all P ∈ P, for all k,k0 ∈
K(π,P), (k,P) ∼ (k0,P).
Intuitively, acts in K(π,P) diﬀer only by the permutation of outcomes on events
of equal probability for all priors in P, a manipulation that amounts to relabeling
these events. From a (strict) normative point of view, such a relabeling should not
aﬀect the decision maker’s preference, because this would amount to a framing eﬀect.
This is the intuition that motivates axiom 3.
In the usual setting of decision under risk, objects of choice are assumed to be
lotteries. In fact, this setting corresponds to a situation where the decision maker has
precise information (i.e. P is a singleton), and axiom 3 holds. When information
is imprecise, one approach taken in the literature is to deﬁne preferences directly on
sets of lotteries (Olszewski 2002, revised 2006, Ahn 2003, revised 2005, Stinchcombe
2003). This approach requires a strengthening of axiom 3 to appear as a special
case of the approach followed here, namely an axiom requiring that acts inducing
the same set of lotteries from a set of priors P be indiﬀerent, while axiom 3 requires
this only if the induced set of lotteries is a singleton.
The introduction of the relation %P allows us to state the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 Let f,g ∈ F and P ∈ P. We shall say that f and g are P-






The intuition behind this deﬁnition is the following. Given an information set
P and an act f, one can associate to each P ∈ P a lottery P f. Moreover, one can
associate to f an ordering %f on P deﬁned by:
P %
f Q ⇐⇒ P
f %P Q
f.
This ordering answers the following question: “If I were given the choice between
an act that, conditional on my information, unambiguously induces the lottery P f,
and one that unambiguously induces the lottery Qf, which one would I choose?”
If I choose P f, this means that, given the choice of act f, I deem the scenario
corresponding to P to be more favorable than the scenario corresponding to Q. For
instance, in the three color Ellsberg urn with 30 red ball and 60 black or yellow balls,
given the act fB corresponding to betting on black, the decision maker would deem
the scenario corresponding to the following proportions of red, black and yellow
balls: (1
3, 2





















This ordering therefore ranks scenarios according to how relatively favorable they
are given act f. Now, two acts are P-comonotonic as deﬁned if, roughly speaking,
they order the scenarios in the same way regarding how favorable they are. If
they order scenarios in the same way, they do not provide any hedging opportunity
against each other, not in the usual sense of compensating bad states of nature for
one act with good states for the other, but of compensating bad scenarios with good
scenarios.
Comonotonicity is a notion that has been introduced in the literature on decision
under uncertainty for states of nature, not for probabilistic scenarios. Recall that,
given an information set P, two acts f and g are comonotonic if, for all s,s0 ∈ S,
(f(s),P)  (f(s
0),P) =⇒ (g(s),P) % (g(s
0),P).
One may wonder whether there is some relationship between the two notions. The
answer is no. To see that, we shall give two examples.
Example 1 (Comonotonicity does not imply P-comonotonicity) Let S = X =
9[0,1], P = {P,Q} where P is the Lebesgue measure and Q has the following density





4s if s ∈ [0, 1
2],
4(1 − s) if s ∈ [1
2,1].
Consider the following preference relation over act-information pairs:






















0 if s ∈ [0, 1
4],






0 if s ∈ [0, 3
4],
1 if s ∈ (3
4,1].




















so that P g Q: f and g are not P-comonotonic.
Example 2 (P-comonotonicity does not imply comonotonicity) In the same setting





0 if s ∈ [0, 1
2],






1 if s ∈ [0, 1
2],
0 if s ∈ (1
2,1].
Then f and g are not comonotonic, but they are P-comonotonic, as P and Q
have symmetric densities around 1
2.
Now, if two acts f and g are P-comonotonic, i.e. do not provide any hedge
against each other with respect to the potential scenarios, and if f is preferred to g
given information P, this means, roughly speaking, that “on average” f performs
better than g with respect to information P, for instance if it is deﬁnitely better
with respect to good scenarios, though it might not dominate g with respect to bad
scenarios. If h is P-comonotonic with both f and g, mixing it – in the sense of
grafting – with both of them will result in two acts that bear the same relation as f
and g with respect to potential scenarios. Therefore, their preference ranking should
10be the same as that of the original acts, provided the probabilities on the algebra
generated by f, g and h given by the scenarios in P are not aﬀected by conditioning
on the event used to perform the grafting operation, that is, provided the event is
independent of f, g and h w.r.t. to all the scenarios. This normatively appealing
behavior is what the next axiom requires:
Axiom 4 (Information-Contingent Comonotonic Independence) For all P ∈ P, for
all f,g,h ∈ F pairwise P-comonotonic, for all A ∈ Σ such that A ⊥P {f,g,h},
(f,P) % (g,P) ⇐⇒ (fAh,P) % (gAh,P).
Based on the same interpretive line, it seems normatively compelling that act f
be preferred to act g given information P whenever in each scenario of P, act f
induces a more desirable lottery than act g:
Axiom 5 (Information-Contingent Dominance) For all f,g ∈ F, for all P ∈ P,
(∀P ∈ P, P
f %P P
g) =⇒ (f,P) % (g,P).
The next axiom requires only that the problem be non-trivial.
Axiom 6 (Non-Degeneracy) For all P ∈ P, there exist f,g ∈ F such that
(f,P)  (g,P).
Constant acts in F correspond to actions that are not state-contingent. Uncer-
tainty is therefore irrelevant to them, and so is, of course, information about this
uncertainty. This is the meaning of the next axiom. In a sense, this axiom also
implies that the objectively given information does not aﬀect the decision-maker’s
conﬁdence in the accuracy of the description of uncertainty by the list of states in
S.
Axiom 7 (Preferences under Certainty) For all P,P0 ∈ P, for all x ∈ X, (x,P) ∼
(x,P0).
The last two axioms are essentially technical and require richness in the setting.
Axiom 8 would automatically hold whenever X is a connected topological space and
for each P the preference over F given P is continuous:
Axiom 8 (Certainty Equivalent) For all P ∈ P, for all f ∈ F, there exists x ∈ X
such that (x,P) ∼ (f,P).
The next axiom says that any rule that transforms each scenario compatible with
objective information into a speciﬁc lottery on the space of outcomes can be imple-
mented in a subjectively equivalent way by choosing an act in the set of available
11acts.
Axiom 9 (Denseness of the Set of Acts) For all P ∈ P, for all function
F : P → ∆(X),
if there exist ¯ π,
¯
π ∈ ∆(X) such that
¯ π %P F(P) %P ¯
π, ∀P ∈ P,
then there exists f ∈ F such that, for all P ∈ P,
P
f ∼P F(P).
It is easy to show that the previous axioms imply that, for each P ∈ P, there




The eﬀect of this axiom is therefore to strengthen this result to get a uniform f.
3 The Representation Theorem
3.1 Statement
In order to introduce the representation theorem, we recall the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2 Let (Ω,A ) be a measurable space. A capacity on (Ω,A ) is a function
ν : A → R such that:
(i) ν(∅) = 0 and ν(Ω) = 1;
(ii) For all A,B ∈ A , A ⊆ B =⇒ ν(A) ≤ ν(B).
Let ϕ : Ω → R. We say that ϕ is A -measurable if, for all t ∈ R,
(ϕ > t) := {ω ∈ Ω | ϕ(ω) ≥ t} ∈ A .
Then, for all A -measurable functions ϕ, the Choquet integral of ϕ with respect to










12If ϕ is ﬁnite-valued, there exist families (Ai)i=1,...,n, Ai ∈ A and (xi)i=1,...,n with
xi ∈ R such that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ... ≤ xn and ϕ takes the value xi on the set Ai. Then,











We can now state the main representation theorem:
Theorem 1
If % satisﬁes axioms 1 through 9, then, there exist a non-constant function u : X → R
and, for all P ∈ P, a capacity νP on P such that:
(f,P) % (g,P








u ◦ f dP

dνP(P) (2)
Moreover, u is deﬁned up to an aﬃne increasing transformation and for each P, νP
is unique.
Remark 1 All axioms except axioms 8 (certainty equivalent) and 9 (denseness),
are also necessary. The proof is omitted.
The proof strategy is very intuitive. It mainly consists in three steps. First, to
each act-information pair (f,P) ∈ F × P, associate the Anscombe-Aumann act
F f : P −→ ∆(X)
P 7−→ P f.




g ⇐⇒ (f,P) % (g,P)
and show that it can be extended to a binary relation on the set of all bounded
Anscombe-Aumann acts. Finally, show that the extended relation %0
AA satisﬁes
Schmeidler (89)’s axioms.
The theorem provides a very natural (as if) description of the decision-maker’s
behavior under objective ambiguity: given some imprecise information objectively
describable by a (convex-ranged) set of probability distributions, the decision maker
forms a prior regarding the relative likelihood of each of the scenarios associated with
13each probability distribution. This prior is not necessarily additive (and must not
be, indeed, if the decision maker exhibits ambiguity aversion, as we shall see below).
He or she then computes the average (in the sense of Choquet) expected utility of
the acts considered and chooses the act with higher average expected utility. This
decision procedure is consistent with an intuitive account of the Ellsberg paradox
whereby ambiguity aversion is explained by the fact that the decision maker deems
the unfavorable scenarios as more likely than the favorable ones.
3.2 An Example
Consider a machine that is out of order2. The decision maker has two possibilities:
having the machine repaired or buying a new one. Having the machine repaired
costs c while buying a new one costs p. The revenue from using the machine is b.
Two states of the world are possible: either the machine works after having been
repaired (state s), or it does not (state s0). Denote by f the act corresponding to
having the machine repaired and g the act corresponding to buying a new one. We
have f(s) = b − c, f(s0) = −c and g(s) = g(s0) = b − p as the net proﬁt from
the new machine is independent from the fact that the older one works after being
repaired. We assume b > p > c > 0. In order to repair the machine, an electronic
component is needed. This component can be of three diﬀerent types A, B or C.
The probability for the machine to be successfully repaired is p1 if the component
is of type A, p2 if it is of type B, p3 if it is of type C, with p1 < p2 < p3. Moreover
the information known about the average composition of a batch from which the
component is taken is that the proportion of components of a given type is at most
α, with 1
2 ≥ α ≥ 1
3. This can be summarized by a set
Π = {π ∈ ∆(P) | πi ≤ α,∀i = 1,2,3},
where P = {p1,p2,p3}, ∆(P) is the set of probability distributions over P and
πi is the probability of pi. The condition πi ≤ α for all i is readily seen to imply
that 1 − 2α ≤ πi for all i. Jaﬀray (1989) shows that this set of probabilities can
be represented by its lower envelope3, the capacity ν∗ such that ν∗(pi) = 1 − 2α for
i = 1,2,3 and ν∗({pi,pj}) = 1 − α for i,j = 1,2,3, or by its upper envelope4 ν∗
deﬁned by ν∗(pi) = α for i = 1,2,3 and ν∗({pi,pj}) = 2α for i,j = 1,2,3. Assuming
that u(b − c) = 2, u(b − p) = 1 and u(−c) = 0, using the functional axiomatized in
2For the sake of simplicity, in this example, we focus on the use of the decision rule axiomatized
and do not try to meet all the technical requirements of the theorem.
3In the sense that Π = {π ∈ ∆(P) | π ≥ ν∗}.
4In the sense that Π = {π ∈ ∆(P) | π ≤ ν∗}.
14the theorem ﬁrst with ν∗ and second with ν∗ yields the following values for f:
V∗(f) = 2(αp1 + αp2 + (1 − 2α)p3),
V
∗(f) = 2((1 − 2α)p1 + αp2 + αp3)
and V∗(g) = V ∗(g) = 1. Therefore, when he or she uses ν∗ the decision maker must
have the machine repaired if and only if
αp1 + αp2 + (1 − 2α)p3 ≥
1
2
and when he or she uses ν∗:




In words, in both cases some weighted average of the probabilities of success must
exceed 1/2. The level of α can be seen as a measure of the imprecision of information
concerning the proportion of components of a given type: the higher α, the higher
the imprecision. Now imprecision of information can be seen alternatively as leaving
room for a high probability of ending with a good component or with a bad one.
Therefore, according to whether one sees the glass half-full of half-empty, imprecision
can be seen as good or bad. The case of ν∗ corresponds to the “half-empty” point
of view: the higher α, the more demanding the rule is, as this gives more weight
to the bad cases, requiring the lowest probability of success to be still rather good.
On the contrary, the use of ν∗ corresponds to the “half-full” point of view, as when
imprecision increases it becomes a less strict decision rule, only asking for the highest
probability of success to be high.
4 Special Cases
The representation given here is quite ﬂexible (although not being completely unre-
stricted as the axioms show). It can indeed encompass a variety of models. We will
next provide some examples.
4.1 Information-Based Choquet Expected Utility
The theorem yields a characterization of the decision rule used by the decision
maker’s which involves second-order beliefs, i.e. beliefs over probabilistic scenarios.
However, it says nothing about his or her beliefs about states of the world, and in
15particular about the relationship between these beliefs and the objective information.
The following proposition addresses this issue. It is a straightforward consequence of
the properties of the Choquet integral: positive homogeneity, comonotonic additivity
and monotonicity. We omit details.
Proposition 1
Let % satisfy all the conditions of the theorem. Then, for each P, there exists a
unique capacity ρP : Σ → [0,1] such that, for all A ∈ Σ, for all x,y ∈ X such that
(x,P)  (y,P)
V (xAy,P) = ρP(A)u(x) + (1 − ρP(A))u(y). (3)





and satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) For all A,B ∈ Σ,
(∀P ∈ P,P(A) ≥ P(B)) =⇒ ρP(A) ≥ ρP(B).
(ii) For all A,B ∈ Σ, such that A ∩ B = ∅, if, for all P,Q ∈ P, P(A) >
Q(A) =⇒ P(B) ≥ Q(B), then ρP(A ∪ B) = ρP(A) + ρP(B).
This proposition shows ﬁrst that the preferences axiomatized in this paper belong
to the biseparable class studied by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001). Following their
terminology, the capacity ρP may be interpreted as the decision maker’s willingness
to bet, i.e. the number of euros he or she is willing to pay for a bet yielding one euro
if event A obtains and nothing otherwise. If one is willing to deﬁne the fact that A is
deemed more likely than B if betting on A is preferred to betting on B, then ρP can
be said to represent beliefs given information P. However, as pointed out by Nehring
(1994), in the context of ambiguity, this deﬁnition is somewhat arbitrary: one could
also deﬁne belief by the fact that betting on the complement of B is preferred to
betting on the complement of A, and, in the context of ambiguous information these
notions would not be equivalent. Indeed, the second notion would be numerically
represented by ρP’s dual capacity ¯ ρP deﬁned by ¯ ρP(A) = 1 − ρP(Ac), which does
not yield the same ordering on Σ.
This being said, it is noteworthy that willingness to bet is here deﬁned from the
available information as an aggregation of this information that satisﬁes a unanim-
16ity property: if in all probabilistic scenarios A is more likely than B, i.e. if A is
unambiguously more likely than B, then the decision maker will be more willing to
bet on A than to bet on B. This is property (i), a rationality property of subjective
beliefs with respect to objective information. Property (ii) says, in turn, that if the
scenarios in which disjoint events A and B are not very likely to obtain are the same,
then the willingness to bet on the join of these events is the sum of the willingness to
bet on each of them. This reﬂects the fact that in some sense there is no interaction
between them, which would appear as an additional term in the sum.
An important consequence of this proposition is that, if νP is additive, then so is
ρP. But this is incompatible with the Ellsberg paradox, as it is well known. There-
fore, in order to be descriptively accurate and to account for ambiguity aversion, νP
must not be additive.
Given that V (.,P) is a Choquet expected utility when restricted to binary acts,
one may wonder under what conditions it has this functional form on all acts. It
turns out that it suﬃces to impose a dominance axiom to obtain this result. Deﬁne,
for A,B ∈ Σ,
A D
P B ⇐⇒ (xAy,P) % (xBy,P),
for some x,y ∈ X with (x,P)  (y,P). This deﬁnes a comparative likelihood
relation on events. The previous proposition shows that when all the axioms hold
it is well deﬁned and numerically represented by ρP. Let, for f ∈ F and x ∈ X,
{f % x}P := {s ∈ S | (f(s),P) % (x,P)}.
Consider the following axiom
Axiom 10 (Cumulative dominance (Sarin and Wakker 1992))
For all f,g ∈ F, (∀x ∈ X,{f % x}P DP {g % x}P) =⇒ (f,P) % (g,P).
This axiom has the ﬂavor of the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance axiom, although
it is stated here without any reference to a probability distribution. It says that if
the decision maker believes that act f will yield a higher outcome than a given one
with higher likelihood than g will, given information P, then f is preferable to g.
Proposition 2
Let % be a preference relation represented by a SODEU functional. Then, % satisﬁes





17The import of this proposition is twofold. First, it allows to understand how
non-additive probabilities and Choquet expected utility arise from the perception of
ambiguity by the decision maker. He or she aggregates the probabilistic information
at his or her disposal through a weighted average, but in a way that is event-
dependent: the weight that is attributed to a prior depends on the fact that it gives
a relatively high or low probability to the event considered. This mechanism is
however consistent with the probabilistic information in the sense that it respects
the fact that some event has a uniformly higher probability than another. Second,
it shows that Choquet expected utility is a special case of a more general model that
obtains when some fairly natural rationality condition is satisﬁed. This reinforces
the idea that the increased descriptive power of this model relative to expected
utility does not come at the cost of abandoning too much of the normative status
the latter was able to achieve.
4.2 Restricted Maxmin Expected Utility
Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2006) axiomatize a version of maxmin
expected utility where the decision maker maximizes the minimum expected utility
over a subset of the objective set of priors. Speciﬁcally, let Pc be the set of closed
convex hulls of ﬁnite sets of countably additive non-atomic probability measures.
By the Lyapunov theorem, Pc ⊆ P and, moreover, Pc is a mixture set when we
deﬁne the following mixture operation:
λP + (1 − λ)P
0 = {λP + (1 − λ)P
0 | P ∈ P,P
0 ∈ P
0}.
Adapting the notations to our setup, Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud’s ax-
ioms deliver a function Φ : P → PC, where PC is the set of closed5 convex hulls of
elements of P, such that
(i) for all P ∈ P, Φ(P) ⊆ co(P);
(ii) for all λ ∈ [0,1], for all P,P0 ∈ Pc,
Φ(λP + (1 − λ)P
0) = λΦ(P) + (1 − λ)Φ(P
0)
and such that the decision maker maximizes the minimum expected utility over
priors in Φ(P).
5In the weak* topology, i.e. the product topoloy.
18We will now show that this functional form can be obtained in our setting by
specifying the family of capacities νP in an appropriate way. In order to introduce
the restrictions needed to obtain this representation, we recall the following deﬁni-
tion: a capacity ν deﬁned over some measurable space (Ω,A ) is convex if for all
A,B ∈ A ,
ν(A ∪ B) + ν(A ∩ B) ≥ ν(A) + ν(B).
We can now state the next proposition:
Proposition 3
Let % be a preference relation represented by the SODEU functional V such that
u(X) is connected and for all P ∈ P, νP is convex. Then, there exists a unique
function Φ : P → PC, such that for all P ∈ P, Φ(P) ⊆ co(P) and
V (f,P) = min
P∈Φ(P)
Z
u ◦ fdP. (5)
Moreover, if, in addition, we have that, for all P,P0 ∈ Pc, for all λ ∈ [0,1], for
all f ∈ F,
V (f,λP + (1 − λ)P
0) = λV (f,P) + (1 − λ)V (f,P
0),
then
Φ(λP + (1 − λ)P
0) = λΦ(P) + (1 − λ)Φ(P
0).
To what axioms does the previous restriction correspond in our setting? The
answer is quite easy to ﬁgure out, given the axioms in Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and
Vergnaud (2006). Consider the following axioms:
Axiom 11 (Uncertainty Aversion) For all P ∈ P, for all f,g ∈ F, for all A ⊥P
{f,g},
(f,P) ∼ (g,P) =⇒ (fAg,P) % (f,P) ∼ (g,P).
Axiom 12 (Information Independence) For all P,P0,P00 ∈ Pc, for all f ∈ F, for
all λ ∈ [0,1],
(f,P) % (f,P
0) ⇐⇒ (f,λP + (1 − λ)P
00) % (f,λP
0 + (1 − λ)P
00).
By (Schmeidler 1989)’s argument, adding axiom 11 to the other axioms of the
representation theorem implies immediately that νP is convex for all P ∈ P. We
skip the details.
In turn, axiom 12 characterizes mixture linearity with respect to information
19sets, as shown by the next proposition:
Proposition 4
Let % be a preference relation represented by the SODEU functional V . Then %
satisﬁes axiom 12 if and only if for all f ∈ F, P,P0 ∈ Pc,
V (f,λP + (1 − λ)P
0) = λV (f,P) + (1 − λ)V (f,P
0).
For completeness we repeat the simple proof of Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and
Vergnaud (2006). See appendix.
4.3 The security level and potential outcome eﬀects
Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2006), Kopylov (2006) have axiomatized a
special case of the restricted maxmin of the following form:
V
S(f,P) = (1 − ε)
Z




where c(P) ∈ pc(Σ) and ε ∈ [0,1]. This functional form, that we shall call the
security level functional, has many possible interpretations, more or less formally
grounded. Ellsberg, who introduced it, interprets the coeﬃcient (1 − ε) as degree
of conﬁdence in the probability estimate c(P). The idea is that the decision maker
forms prior c(P) based on information P, computes the expected utility with re-
spect to it, and then corrects it by a factor ε(minP∈P
R
u ◦ fdP −
R
u ◦ fdc(P))
that takes into accounts mistakes by computing the diﬀerence between the estimated
expected utility and the prudent maxmin rule.
Another interpretation, the one found in Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud
(2006), is that ε measures the aversion towards imprecision of the decision maker.
This interpretation if grounded on a comparative deﬁnition of imprecision aversion
and a deﬁnition of relative imprecision premium measuring the willingness to pay of
the decision maker for a more precise information.
Finally, an interpretation that is not mentioned in any paper to the best of
our knowledge, but that can be inferred from Kopylov’s axiomatization is that the
decision maker cares for the security level of a given act, i.e. he or she favors acts
that guarantee a higher utility outcome, to an extent measured by coeﬃcient ε, so
that his or her choice depends on both the expected utility of the act and its security
level. The idea to introduce this security factor in the study of decision under risk is
usually attributed to Lopes (1987). It was axiomatized by Jaﬀray (1988) and Gilboa
(1988) in that context.
20Lopes not only pointed out the importance of the security factor in the decision
making process under risk. She also drew attention on a symmetric factor: the
potential factor of a given act, i.e. the maximal outcome that this act can yield.
Cohen (1992) has proposed a non continuous model that incorporates both the
security factor and the potential factor, along with expected utility, in the decision
making process under risk. In the context of imprecise risk we are considering here,
it is also possible to incorporate both factors in a decision model, by generalizing











with γ ∈ [0,1].
This functional form can be retrieved by choosing for νP a capacity of the fol-
lowing type. Let υ∅ be the capacity deﬁned by υ∅(P) = 1 for all non-empty P ⊆ P
and υP be deﬁned by υP(P) = 0 for all P ( P. Let m(P) be a probability charge
on 2P. Let νP be deﬁned by:
νP = (1 − ε)m(P) + ε(γυP + (1 − γ)υ∅).
This kind of capacity is introduced and studied in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and






and if V is the SODEU functional associated with νP, then V = V SP.
The axiomatic foundations of this functional form in the present context can be
deduced from the work in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2006). This requires
some deﬁnitions and a bit of notation.
Deﬁnition 3 Let (f,P) ∈ F × P and π ∈ ∆(X). π is in the indiﬀerence set of
the inﬁmum of (f,P), denoted Inf(f,P), if
(i) (f,P) ∼ (f,P), where f is such that
P
f ∼P P f ∀P / ∈ P
P
f ∼P π ∀P ∈ P
and P = {P ∈ P | π P P f},
21(ii) (g,P)  (f,P), where, for all π0 P π, g is such that
P
g ∼P P f ∀P / ∈ Q
P
g ∼P π0 ∀P ∈ Q
and Q = {P ∈ P | π0 %P P f}.
The indiﬀerence set of the supremum of (f,P), Sup(f,P), is deﬁned similarly by
reversing all inequalities.
When there is no risk of confusion, by a slight abuse of notation we denote
by Inf(f,P) and Sup(f,P) arbitrary elements of these sets. These sets give the
preference-based deﬁnition of extreme distributions induced by a given act.If Pf is
ﬁnite, then the indiﬀerence class of its smallest elements w.r.t. %P is Inf(f,P).
To each act-information pair, we associate the following sets of acts: F(f,P),
which is the set of acts h such that there exists a scenario where both f and h induce
a lottery that is worse than their respective inﬁmum indiﬀerence sets:
F(f,P) := {h ∈ F | ∃P ∈ P,P
f -P Inf(f,P) and P
h -P Inf(h,P)},
and F(f,P) which is the set of acts h such that there exists a scenario where both
f and h induce a lottery that is better than their respective supremum indiﬀerence
sets:
F(f,P) := {h ∈ F | ∃P ∈ P,P
f %P Sup(f,P) and P
h %P Sup(h,P)}
We introduce the following axiom: let P4 ⊂ P be the set of information sets
containing at least 4 distinct priors.
Axiom 13 (Extreme Scenarios Sensitivity) For any f,g,h ∈ F, for any P ∈ P4
such that (f,P) ∼ (g,P) and h ∈ F(g,P) ∩ F(g,P), for any A ⊥P {f,g,h},
1. If h ∈ F(f,P) then (gAh,P) % (fAh,P),
2. If h ∈ F(f,P) then (fAh,P) % (gAh,P).
The ﬁrst part of this axiom says that if f and h induce their unfavorable distri-
butions in the same scenarios, then hedging g with h can be no worse than hedging
f with h. The second part of this axiom has a similar interpretation.
This axiom is essentially necessary and suﬃcient to characterize the functional
V SP as a special case of the SODEU functional, as shown by the following proposi-
tion.
22Proposition 5
Let % be represented by an SODEU functional V such that for all P ∈ P, νP(P) =
0 =⇒ P = ∅, for all P ⊆ P. Assume that % satisﬁes axiom 9 and that there
exists ¯ π,π ∈ ∆(X) such that ¯ π P π and for all π ∈ ∆(X), ¯ π %P π %P π. Then
V (f,P) = V SP(f,P) for all f ∈ F and for all P ∈ P4 if and only if % satisﬁes
axiom 13.
4.4 Weighted Worst Scenarios
A very extreme special case of the functional V SP introduced above obtains by
taking ε = γ = 1. It is the well-known maxmin rule axiomatized in a fully subjective
setting by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). In the objective setting, an axiomatization
was given by Wang (2001, revised 2003). The idea of this axiomatization is that
decision makers usually prefer having precise rather than imprecise information.
Therefore, Wang deﬁnes what he calls uncertainty aversion and what, following the
remarks in Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2006), we call strong aversion
to imprecision:
Deﬁnition 4 A decision maker is strongly averse to imprecision if, for all P,P0 ∈ P,
P ⊆ P
0 =⇒ (f,P) % (f,P
0), ∀f ∈ F.
As a consequence of this deﬁnition, we have the following result, which is a version
in our setting of similar results in the literature (see, e.g., Wang (2001, revised 2003,
Theorem 3.1)):
Proposition 6
A decision maker satisfying the axioms of the representation theorem is strongly
averse to imprecision if and only if for all sets P ∈ P and all f ∈ F,





This decision rule is rather extreme. To see that consider the following example:
Example 3 Let S = [0,1], X = R, u(x) = x for all x ∈ X and f = 1[0, 1
3]. Consider
the set P = {P1,P2,P3} where P1 is the Lebesgue measure on [0,1], P2 deﬁned by
P2(A) = P1(A | [2
3,1]) and P3 = εP1 + (1 − ε)P2, ε ∈ [0,1]. Then if the decision
maker has strong aversion to imprecision, then (f,{P3})  (f,P) for all ε > 0. But
if ε is very small, this mean preferring a precise but very unfavorable information
set to an imprecise one but that contains at least one not so unfavorable scenario:
23P1.
Now the SODEU functional contains as a special case a functional that general-
izes the maxmin rule in the following sense: instead of considering only the overall
worst scenario, the decision maker considers also worst scenarios on some subsets of
the information set, and attributes some weight to these less severe worst scenarios.
The intuition behind this decision rule would be that the decision maker does not
consider himself or herself unlucky enough to only consider the worst possible sce-
nario. He or she considers that she might as well be lucky and have to deal only
with a less unfavorable set of scenarios than the one he or she is facing. Another
way of understanding this rule is that the decision maker might have some doubt
as to the objective nature of the set of priors he or she is facing, and this doubt
may be represented by a probability distribution on the subsets of this set. The idea
would be that the objectively given set is but the upper bound on how imprecise
the information is but that it can be less imprecise with some probability.
To avoid technical complications and focus on the intuition, we will present
the rule in the case where the information set is ﬁnite. Denote P0 the set of ﬁnite
information sets. The functional V : F ×P0 is a Weighted Worst Scenarios (WWS)
functional if for all P ∈ P0 there exists a probability distribution αP on 2P r{∅}








This functional is indeed a special case of the SODEU functional: it suﬃces to
take for νP a belief function and take for αP its Moebius transform. Recall that a
capacity ν deﬁned on some measurable space (Ω,A ) is a belief function if and only








We refer to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) for details and for how to extend this
functional form to inﬁnite sets P.
The WWS functional provides an answer to the paradox raised in example 3.
Indeed, simple calculations show that
(f,{P3})  (f,P) ⇐⇒ ε >
αP(P1)
1 − αP(P3) − αP({P1,P3})
.
Therefore, the decision maker will prefer the precise scenario P3 only if this scenario
24is not too unfavorable, where the notion of “too unfavorable” is a subjective notion
related to αP.
Notice that the WWS functional can be rewritten in a form that makes it easily
comparable to the security level functional V S. If P = {P1,...,Pn}, letting














WWS(f,P) = (1 − ε)
Z








This formula shows that the WWS functional is a generalization of the V S functional
of a diﬀerent type than the V SP functional. We leave its axiomatization for further
research.
5 Ambiguity Attitude
One of the main assets of a setting with an objective but ambiguous probabilistic
information is that one can clearly distinguish perceived ambiguity from objective
ambiguity. Ambiguity attitudes can aﬀect perceived ambiguity, as shown by the ﬁrst
representation theorem in Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2006), so that
the interpretation of a fully subjective set of priors like the one that appears in the
axiomatization of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is not completely clear. Gajdos,
Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud have shown in a precise way how ambiguity attitude
aﬀects perceived ambiguity: the less ambiguity averse the decision maker is, the
smaller number of priors he or she takes into account. At the limit, ambiguity
neutral decision makers collapse the set of priors to a unique prior.
In this section, we intend to pursue the analysis of ambiguity attitude in the
context of the SODEU functional.
5.1 Ambiguity Aversion
What is however the natural deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion in our setting? In order
to answer this question, we introduce, for all P ∈ P the notion of P-unambiguous
acts
25Deﬁnition 5 For all P ∈ P, f ∈ F is a P-unambiguous act if P f = Qf,∀P,Q ∈ P.
Notice that a P-unambiguous act is P-comonotonic to any act in F. There-
fore, P-unambiguous acts are crisp in the sense of Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and
Marinacci (2001), i.e. hedging with respect to them does not aﬀect preference. Let
F P−ua be the set of P-unambiguous acts. We can now give the following deﬁnition
of comparative ambiguity aversion given information P.
Deﬁnition 6 Let %1 and %2 be the preference relations of two decision makers.
Then decision maker 1 is more ambiguity averse than decision maker 2 given infor-
mation P if and only if, for all k ∈ F P−ua, for all f ∈ F:
(f,P) %1 (k,P) =⇒ (f,P) %2 (k,P)
and
(f,P) 1 (k,P) =⇒ (f,P) 2 (k,P)
This deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion is similar to the ones in Epstein (1999) and
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), and it is most natural. The following proposition
is an immediate consequence of the results of the latter.
Proposition 7
Let %1 and %2 be the preference relations of two decision makers satisfying the
axioms of the representation theorem. Then decision maker 1 is more ambiguity





This shows, as in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), that a decision maker that
is less ambiguity averse than another one is always more willing to bet, always more
conﬁdent, always less pessimistic.
5.2 Imprecision Aversion
Now, we have analyzed the behavior of a decision-maker given a ﬁxed information.
How will changing information aﬀect his behavior? It is rather natural to consider
that an ambiguity averse decision maker, when about to make a bet, will most of
the time prefer having precise information on the probabilities rather than imprecise
one, whatever the nature of the bet. This idea leads to the following deﬁnition of
imprecision aversion (see Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2006)).
Deﬁnition 7 Let %1 and %2 be the preference relations of two decision makers.
Then decision maker 1 is more imprecision averse than decision maker 2 given
26information P if and only if, for all A ∈ Σ, x,y ∈ X such that (x,P) i (y,P),
i = 1,2, and P ∈ co(P),
(xAy,P) %1 (xAy,{P}) =⇒ (xAy,P) %2 (xAy,{P}).
It turns out that this notion of imprecision aversion is intimately linked to the
willingness to bet of the agent.
Proposition 8
Let %1 and %2 be the preference relations of two decision makers with an SODEU
representation. Then, decision maker 1 is more imprecision averse than decision





It is a straightforward corollary of both propositions that in the SODEU model
ambiguity aversion implies imprecision aversion.
6 Conclusion
We have axiomatized in what seems to us a rather simple way a model of decision
making under ambiguous objective information (imprecise risk) where the decision
maker maximizes the (Choquet) average expected utility of a given act with respect
to some second order belief. We characterized some special cases, among which the
case where this functional form reduces to Choquet Expected Utility with respect
to a capacity that is consistent with information in the sense that it gives higher
likelihood to A than to B whenever for each prior A is more likely than B. This
provides foundations for the intuition according to which decision makers facing
imprecise risk aggregate information into one single likelihood measure in a way that
is nevertheless compatible with ambiguity aversion. We show how diﬀerent forms
of ambiguity aversion can be characterized in our model in terms of the diﬀerent
capacities that can be deﬁned in the SODEU model, and how they are related to
each other.
There are some open problems that we plan to address in future research. Some
are of a technical nature, some of a conceptual one, some of a practical one.
As for technical issues, our axiomatization of second order beliefs has in our
opinion the advantage on some other axiomatizations of not taking as primitives
some second-order devices like second-order acts in Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Muk-
erji (2005) or lotteries over acts in Seo (2006). However this comes at the cost of
an extra non-necessary axiom, the denseness axiom, and of adding more structure
27on the admissible sets of priors, namely range-convexity, and therefore ruling out
complete ignorance as modeled by taking the set of all possible priors. The question
of how to keep the same advantage without incurring that cost is open for future
research.
As for conceptual issue, we see at least three interesting possible developments.
First, some time should be devoted in future research to the links between the
second order capacities associated with diﬀerent information sets. This question
is intimately linked to the question of updating information and conditioning ca-
pacities, which, as it is well known, does not have a canonical solution. Second,
as we pointed out, the SODEU model is dual to the SOSEU model of (Klibanoﬀ,
Marinacci, and Mukerji 2005) and (Seo 2006). Therefore, it would be interesting to
axiomatize the nesting model, in order to make their relationship clear in terms of
behavioral foundations. Third, our model, like many others, is not consistent with
the Allais paradox, in the sense that it reduces to expected utility for precise risk.
Therefore, it would be desirable to extend it to cover this case.
As for practical issues, applications should be developed to at least to diﬀerent
domains. First, in principal agent problems, it is often assumed that the principal
and the agent have a common prior. Our model might be a way of studying the case
where they have a common imprecise prior. Second, in location models in industrial
organization, ﬁrms do know in a precise way the distribution of customers on the
product space. Our model could be used to study the case of an imprecisely known
distribution.
A Proofs
Theorem 1. Before proving the theorem, we prove a very useful lemma that is of
independent interest and that will be used repeatedly in the proof.
Lemma 1 Let P ∈ P, F ⊆ F ﬁnite and α ∈ (0,1). Then, there exists A ∈ Σ such
that P(A) = α for all P ∈ P and A ⊥P F.
Proof. We shall prove the proposition for three acts f,g,h only. Generalization to
any ﬁnite F is straightforward but involves cumbersome notations.
Let f,g,h be simple acts. Therefore, there exist
• ﬁnite sequences {xi}1≤i≤n, {yj}1≤j≤m and {zk}1≤k≤p of elements of X,
• ﬁnite measurable partitions {Fi}1≤i≤n, {Gj}1≤j≤m and {Hk}1≤k≤p of S
such that f(Fi) = {xi}, g(Gj) = {yj}, h(Hk) = {zk}.
28By range-convexity of P, for all i,j,k, there exists Aijk ⊆ Fi∩Gj∩Hk such that





Clearly, because {Fi}1≤i≤n, {Gj}1≤j≤m and {Hk}1≤k≤p are partitions, P(A) = α
for all P ∈ P. Now let us show that it is independent from f (the proof for g and
h are identical).
Take x ∈ X. If x / ∈ f(S), then P(f−1(x) ∩ A) = 0 = 0 × P(A) = P f(x)P(A). If
x ∈ f(S), there exists i0 such that x = xi0. Therefore, for all P ∈ P,
P(f































The proof of the theorem proceeds in several steps.
Step 1. Fix P ∈ P. Given f ∈ F, one can canonically associate a function:
F
f
P :P → ∆(X)
P 7→ P
f.
This function will be call the Anscombe-Aumann or AA-act generated by
f under information P.
Let A (F,P) := {F ∈ ∆(X)P | ∃f ∈ F,F = F
f
P} be the set of all
AA-act generated by F under information P. For convenience and when
no confusion might arise, we shall drop the reference to P and write only
F f and A (F).
Step 2. Consider relation %P. The following lemma will imply that it is reﬂexive.
Lemma 2 For all P ∈ P, for all π ∈ ∆(X), there exists k ∈ F such that,
P k = π for all P ∈ P.
29Proof. Let E = {x1,...,xn} be the support of π. The proof will proceed
by induction on the size of E.
If n = 1, π is a degenerate measure with atom x1. Therefore, as x1 generates
π = δx1 for all P ∈ P, we can take k = x1.
Now assume the lemma is true for n ≥ 1 and show it therefore holds for






1−π(x1) if x 6= x1
πx1(x1) = 0.
The size of the support of πx1 is now n. We can therefore apply the
induction hypothesis to ﬁnd an act k1 such that P k1 = πx1 for all P ∈ P.
Now, by range-convexity of P, it is possible to ﬁnd a set A1 ∈ Σ such that
P x1A1k1 = π(x1)δx1 + (1 − π(x1))πx1 for all P ∈ P, where x1A1k1 is the
act yielding x1 on A1 and equal to k1 elsewhere. Setting k = x1A1k1 thus
completes the proof, as π(x1)δx1 + (1 − π(x1))πx1 = π. 
As a consequence, it implies, together with axiom 5, that if F f = F g, then
(f,P) ∼ (g,P). Therefore, one can deﬁne a preference relation %P
AA on





g ⇐⇒ (f,P) % (g,P).
Here again, we shall drop P when no confusion might arise.
As a consequence of lemma 1, by range-convexity of P, for any f,g ∈ F
and any α ∈ [0,1] there exists A ∈ Σ such that, for all P ∈ P,
P
fAg = αP
f + (1 − α)P
g,
i.e. F fAg = αF f + (1 − α)F g. Therefore, the set A (F) is convex. We
wish to show that preference %AA on A (F) satisﬁes all the axioms of the
Choquet Expected Utility model of Schmeidler (1989). Clearly %AA is a
weak order because % is by axiom 1. We shall enumerate the other axioms
as claims.
Claim 1 (Continuity) For all F f,F g,F h ∈ A (F), if F f AA F g AA F h,
then there exists α,β ∈]0,1[ such that:
αF




f + (1 − β)F
h.
30Proof. This follows automatically from axiom 2. 
The following remark will be useful:
Remark 2 Lemma 2 implies that all constant AA-acts belong to A (F).
Identifying constant AA-acts in A (F) and elements of ∆(X), one can
therefore consider the restriction to ∆(X) of the relation %AA. We have,





⇐⇒ (k,P) % (k
0,P) ⇐⇒ π %P π
0.







This formula is equivalent to: P f AA Qf =⇒ P g %AA Qg,
i.e., by the previous remark, to: P f P Qf =⇒ P g %P Qg.
Hence, two AA-acts F f and F g are comonotonic if and only f,g are P-
comonotonic. This allows us to state the following claim:
Claim 2 (Comonotonic Independence) For all F f,F g,F h ∈ A (F) pair-




f + (1 − α)F
h %AA αF
g + (1 − α)F
h.
Proof. By lemma 1, there exists A ∈ Σ, A ⊥P {f,g,h}, such that F fAh =
αF f+(1−α)F h and F gAh = αF g+(1−α)F h. Therefore, because F f,F g,F h
pairwise comonotonic implies by the previous remarks f,g,h pairwise P-
comonotonic,
αF
f + (1 − α)F
h %AA αF
g + (1 − α)F
h ⇐⇒ (fAh,P) % (gAh,P)




The next claim follows directly from the previous remark and axiom 5:
Claim 3 (Dominance) For all F f,F g ∈ A (F), if F f(P) %AA F g(P) for
all P ∈ P, then F f %AA F g.
31The ﬁnal claim of this step of the proof follows from axiom 6:
Claim 4 (Non-Triviality) There exist F f,F g ∈ A (F) s.t. F f AA F g.
Step 3. We will now proceed to construct the objects of the theorem. Because
%AA is a weak order, because of claims 1, 2 and 4 and because all constant
AA-acts are pairwise comonotonic and belong to A (F), restricting %AA
to constant acts allows to show, as a consequence of the Mixture-Space
Theorem, that there exists an aﬃne non-constant function UP : ∆(X) →





0 ⇐⇒ UP(π) ≥ UP(π
0).
We now wish to apply the Choquet Expected Utility theorem of Schmeidler
(1989). However, this theorem is a priori valid only for the whole set of
bounded Anscombe-Aumann acts, i.e. the set of all measurable functions
F from P to ∆(X) such that there exists ¯ π,
¯
π ∈ ∆(X) with
¯ π %AA F(P) %
¯
π, ∀P ∈ P.
We shall denote this set A (P), or, simply A .
Claim 5 A (F) ⊆ A .
Proof. Let f ∈ F and {x1,...,xn} = f(S). Assume w.l.o.g. that
(x1,P) % (x2,P) % ... % (xn,P).
Then, for all i: UP(δx1) ≥ UP(δxi) ≥ UP(δxn).






therefore, for all P ∈ P: UP(δx1) ≥ UP(P f) ≥ UP(δxn),
i.e. F f ∈ A 
We need therefore to extend the relation %AA from A (F) to A in such a
way that the extension still satisﬁes the axioms of the theorem. We deﬁne
therefore the relation %0
AA on A by:
F %
0
AA G ⇐⇒ F
f %AA F
g,
32where f,g are such that P f ∼P F(P) and P g ∼P G(P) for all P ∈ P.
This relation is well-deﬁned because of axioms 1 and 5, and, thanks to
axiom 9, it extends %AA on the whole A . In order to verify that it preserves
the properties of the original relation, it suﬃces to show that the mixture
operation is well-behaved. Take α ∈ [0,1], F,G ∈ A . Then, there exist
f,g ∈ F s.t. P f ∼P F(P) and P g ∼P G(P) for all P ∈ P and A ∈ Σ
such that A ⊥P {f,g} and P(A) = α for all P ∈ P. Then, because %AA
satisﬁes independence on ∆(X), we have, for all P ∈ P:
(αF + (1 − α)G)(P) = αF(P) + (1 − α)G(P) ∼AA αP
f + (1 − α)P
g.
Therefore: P fAg(P) ∼AA αF(P) + (1 − α)G(P) ∀P ∈ P.
This implies that
αF + (1 − α)H %
0
AA αG + (1 − α)H ⇐⇒ (fAh,P) % (gAh,P)
for appropriate f,g,h ∈ F and A ∈ Σ.
We are now in the position to apply Schmeidler’s result. The latter implies










In particular, restricting this result to A (F), we have, for any f,g ∈ F,




g ⇐⇒ V (f,P) ≥ V (g,P),





Step 4. Let uP : X → R be deﬁned by uP(x) = UP(δx), where δx denote the
degenerate measure with support {x}. By axiom 7, for all x,y ∈ X, for all
P,P0 ∈ P: (x,P) % (y,P) ⇐⇒ (x,P0) % (y,P0).
But this is equivalent to: δx %P δy ⇐⇒ δx %P0 δy,
and to δx %P
AA δy ⇐⇒ δx %P0
AA δy.
Therefore, uP and uP0 represent the same ordering on X, so we can nor-
malize them so that uP = u for all P. Let (f,P) and (g,P0) be two
act-information pairs. Let xf ∈ X be the P-certainty equivalent of f and
xg ∈ X be the P0-certainty equivalent of g, i.e. (f,P) ∼ (xf,P) and
33(g,P0) ∼ (xg,P0). They exist by axiom 8. We have:
(f,P) % (g,P
0) ⇐⇒ (xf,P) % (xg,P
0)
⇐⇒ (xf,P) % (xg,P)
⇐⇒ u(xf) ≥ u(xg).
















u ◦ f dP dνP(P)
because UP is aﬃne and P f has ﬁnite support. As the same holds for g,
this completes the existence proof.
Step 5. νP is unique as part of the representation of %0
AA, but this does not auto-
matically guarantee its uniqueness as part of the representation of %. We
will now prove it is nevertheless the case. To see that, take νP and ν
P
1 two
capacities representing %. Let B(F,P) := {UP ◦ F f | f ∈ F}.
As usual, we drop the reference to P and write B(F) and U. Deﬁne two












Then, because both functionals represent the same ordering on B(F), there
exists an increasing function σ : I(B(F)) → R such that I1 = σ ◦ I.
Take now P ⊆ P and π,π0 ∈ ∆(X) such that π AA π0. Normalize
U so that U(π) = 1 and U(π0) = 0. Consider now the second-order act
FP = πPπ0, with obvious notation, and fP the corresponding act delivered
by axiom 9. Then νP(P) =
Z
P









1 (P) = I1(U◦F
fP) = σ(I(U◦F
fP)) = σ(νP(P)).
Therefore, if we could show that σ is aﬃne, then there would exist a > 0
and b such that ν
P
1 (P) = aνP(P)+b for all P ⊆ P. But this would imply
that b = 0 upon taking P = ∅ and a = 1 upon taking P = P and we
would be done.
Let us therefore show that σ is aﬃne. Take t,t0 ∈ I(B(F)) and α ∈ [0,1].
34We want to show that σ(αt+(1−α)t0) = ασ(t)+(1−α)σ(t0). There exist
f,f0 ∈ F such that t = I(U ◦ F f) and t0 = I(U ◦ F f0). As I is continuous
as a Choquet integral and as ∆(X) is convex, there exist π and π0 in ∆(X)
such that U(π) = I(U ◦ F f) = t and U(π0) = I(U ◦ F f0) = t0. Therefore,
σ(αt + (1 − α)t
0) = σ(αU(π) + (1 − α)U(π
0))
= σ(αI(U(π)) + (1 − α)I(U(π
0)))
= σ(I(αU(π) + (1 − α)U(π
0)))
= I1(αU(π) + (1 − α)U(π
0))
= αI1(U(π)) + (1 − α)I1(U(π
0))
= ασ(t) + (1 − α)σ(t
0), i.e. σ is aﬃne. 
Proposition 2. Necessity being straightforward in view of proposition 1, we only
show suﬃciency.
Fix an information set P ∈ P.
Let ΛP = {B ∈ Σ | P(B) = Q(B), ∀P,Q ∈ P.}. For simplicity, throughout
this proof we drop the subscript P and write ρ for ρP and Λ for ΛP. We start by
a lemma.
Lemma 3 Let (Ai)i=1,...,n be a partition of S into events. Then there exists a
partition (Bi)i=1,...,n consisting of elements of Λ such that, for all m ≤ n,
ρ(B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bm) = ρ(A1 ∪ ... ∪ Am).
Proof. The proof is done by induction on m.
For m = 1, by range-convexity of P, there exists B1 ∈ Σ such that P(B1) =
ρ(A1) for all P ∈ P. Therefore, B1 ∈ Λ and ρ(B1) = ρ(A1).
Assume that B1,...,Bm−1 have been constructed. Then by range convexity of
P, there exists Bm ⊆ (B1 ∪ ...Bm−1)c such that
P(Bm) =
ρ(A1 ∪ ... ∪ Am) − ρ(A1 ∪ ... ∪ Am−1)
1 − ρ(A1 ∪ ... ∪ Am−1)
(1 − P(B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bm−1))
=ρ(A1 ∪ ... ∪ Am) − ρ(A1 ∪ ... ∪ Am−1)
35by deﬁnition of B1,...,Bm−1. Therefore, Bm ∈ Λ, B1 ∩ ... ∩ Bm = ∅ and
ρ(B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bm) = P(B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bm)
= P(B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bm−1) + ρ(A1 ∪ ... ∪ Am) − ρ(A1 ∪ ... ∪ Am−1)
= ρ(A1 ∪ ... ∪ Am). 
Consider now an act f. There exists a partition of events (Ai)i=1,...,n and a ﬁnite
sequence of outcomes (xi)i=1,...,n such that (x1,P) % (x2,P) % ... % (xn,P)
and f(Ai) = {xi}. We write f = (x1,A1,...,xn,An). Consider the act g =
(x1,B1,...,xn,Bn) with (Bi)i=1,...,n as in the previous lemma. Then, by axiom 10,
(f,P) ∼ (g,P). Moreover, V (g,P) =
R
S u ◦ gdP for some P ∈ P, therefore we











u ◦ fdρ. 
Proposition 3. Take (f,P) ∈ F ×P. Let pc(P) be the set of probability charges
on 2P. The core of νP, that we shall denote M(P), is deﬁned by:
M(P) = {m ∈ pc(P) | m(P) ≥ νP(P), ∀P ⊆ P}.





























Setting Φ(P) := {ρm | m ∈ M(P)} delivers the sought representation. Clearly
Φ(P) ⊆ co(P) and it is convex as M(P) is. Let us show that it is weak* closed.
Take a sequence (ρmn) of elements of Φ(P) that converges to ρ ∈ pc(Σ). Then,
for all A ∈ Σ, ρmn(A) → ρ(A), i.e.
R
P P(A)dmn → ρ(A). But, as M(P) is




P P(A)dm. But the mother sequence has to converge to the same
36limit, so that ρ(A) =
R
P P(A)dm: ρ ∈ Φ(P).
Let us now show that Φ(P) is the unique weak* compact and convex set that
represents V in the sense of equation 5. Suppose there is another one Ψ(P) and
that there exists ρ0 ∈ Φ(P) r Ψ(P). Then, by a separation theorem, there exists








By renormalizing if necessary, because ϕ is bounded it is w.l.o.g. to assume that
ϕ(S) ⊆ u(X), and, because u(X) is an interval, there exists f ∈ F such that
ϕ = u ◦ f. Therefore,








u ◦ fdρ = V (f,P),
a contradiction. Therefore Φ(P) = Ψ(P).
Let us now show the mixture linearity property of Φ. Take P,P0 ∈ Pc and






00 = V (f,λP + (1 − λ)P
0)


















By uniqueness, this yields Φ(λP + (1 − λ)P0) = λΦ(P) + (1 − λ)Φ(P0). 
Proposition 4. Necessity is trivial. Let us prove suﬃciency. Since P and P0 are
closed and convex, for each f ∈ F, there exist P ∈ P and P 0 ∈ P such that
(f,P) ∼ (f,{P}) and (f,P0) ∼ (f,{P 0}). Two applications of axiom 12 and an
application of axiom 1 therefore imply that
(f,λP + (1 − λ)P
0) ∼ (f,λ{P} + (1 − λ){P
0}).
37Therefore
V (f,λP + (1 − λ)P












= λV (f,{P}) + (1 − λ)V (f,{P
0})
= λV (f,P) + (1 − λ)V (f,P
0). 
Proposition 5. As a preliminary step, we report a version of the representation
theorem in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2006) for the Anscombe and Au-
mann setup. Let P ∈ P4 and consider, as in the proof of the main theorem, the
set A of bounded mappings F : P → ∆(X) endowed with the preference relation
%0
AA. Let F ∈ A and π ∈ ∆(X). π is in the indiﬀerence set of the inﬁmum of F,
denoted Inf(F), if
(i) πPF ∼0
AA F, where P = {P ∈ P | π P F(P)},
(ii) For all π0 AA π, π0QF  F, where, Q = {P ∈ P | π0 %P F(P)}.
The indiﬀerence set of the supremum of (f,P), Sup(f,P), is deﬁned similarly by
reversing all inequalities. Let
A (F) := {H ∈ A | ∃P ∈ P,F(P) -P Inf(F) and H(H) -P Inf(H)},
and
A (F) := {H ∈ H | ∃P ∈ P,F(P) %P Sup(F) and H(P) %P Sup(H)}
Consider the following axiom
AA 1 Let F,G,H ∈ A be such that F ∼0
AA G and H ∈ A (G) ∩ A (G). Then
1. If H ∈ A (F), then αG + (1 − α)H %0
AA αF + (1 − α)H,
2. If H ∈ A (F), then αF + (1 − α)H %0
AA αG + (1 − α)H.
From the proof of the representation theorem in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and
Grant (2006), it can be inferred the following result:
Lemma 4 Assume %0
AA has a CEU representation on A with capacity νP such
that for all P ∈ P4, νP(P) = 0 =⇒ P = ∅, for all P ⊆ P. Then νP is
neo-additive if and only if %0
AA satisﬁes axiom AA1.
38In view of this lemma, necessity of the axiom is easily proved, so that the only
thing that remains to be shown is that if % satisﬁes axiom 13, then %0
AA as deﬁned in
the proof of the representation theorem satisﬁes axiom AA1. Let therefore F,G,H ∈
A be such that F ∼0
AA G and H ∈ A (G) ∩ A (G). By axiom 9, there exist
f,g,h ∈ F such that P f ∼AA F(P), P g ∼AA G(P) and P h ∼AA H(P) for all P ∈ P.
Then (f,P) ∼ (g,P). Assume H ∈ A (F). Then, F h ∈ A (F) by construction,
as all that matters for extreme events are indiﬀerence classes. But A (F) = A (F f)
and therefore h ∈ F(f,P) also by construction. Similarly, H ∈ A (G) ∩ A (G)
if and only if h ∈ F(g,P) ∩ F(g,P). Therefore, axiom 13 implies that for all
A ⊥P {f,g,h}, (gAh,P) % (fAh,P). But, by construction, this is equivalent to
αG + (1 − α)H %0
AA αF + (1 − α)H. A similar proof can be given for the second
part of the axiom. 
















u ◦ fdP ≤
Z
S
u ◦ fdQ ∀Q ∈ P.





u ◦ fdP ≤ V (f,P),
as wanted. The converse is trivial. 
Proposition 7. Fix P ∈ P. Notice ﬁrst that our deﬁnition of comparative am-
biguity aversion is equivalent to the deﬁnition in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002)
when translated to the set of Anscombe-Aumann acts A (F) introduced in the proof
of the main theorem. Therefore, as ∆(X) ⊂ A (F), if decision maker 1 is more am-
biguity averse than decision maker 2 given information P, their preference relations
coincide on ∆(X).
In order to apply Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002)’s theorem 17, we need however
to show that the associated extensions %0
AA,1 and %0
AA,2 bear the same relations in
39terms of comparative ambiguity attitude as relations %AA,1 and %AA,2. Clearly, if
%0
AA,1 is more ambiguity averse than %0
AA,2, then %AA,1 is more ambiguity averse
than %AA,2. To show the converse, take F ∈ A and π ∈ ∆(X) such that F %0
AA,1 π.
Then, by deﬁnition, F f %AA,1 F k for some f such that P f ∼1 F(P) for all P ∈
P that exist by axiom 9 and some k ∈ K(π,P) that exist by lemma 2. Then,
(f,P) %1 (k,P), so that, by assumption, f %2 k, and therefore, F f %AA,2 F k.
But, as %AA,1 and %AA,2 coincide on ∆(X), this implies that F %0
AA,2 π, as wanted.
The other implication is proved similarly.
By theorem 17 of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), therefore, we know that %1
is more ambiguity averse than %2 if and only if ν2
P ≥ ν1
P. 
Proposition 8. Necessity is straightforward. We prove suﬃciency. For simplicity
we drop the superscript P. Suppose there exists A ∈ Σ such that ρ1(A) > ρ2(A).
By deﬁnition of ρ,
inf
P






P(A) ≤ ρ2(A) < ρ1(A) ≤ sup
P
P(A).
We have to distinguish cases:
Case 1 : infP P(A) < ρ2(A) < ρ1(A) < supP P(A). In this case, there exists
P∗ and P ∗ in P such that inf
P




P(A). Therefore, there exists α ∈ (0,1) and P = αP ∗+(1−α)P∗ ∈ co(P)
such that
ρ2(A) < P(A) < ρ1(A).
But this contradicts the deﬁnition of imprecision aversion.
Case 2 : infP P(A) = ρ2(A) < ρ1(A) < supP P(A). Then there exists P ∈ P
such that
ρ2(A) ≤ P(A) < ρ1(A),
again contradicting the deﬁnition of imprecision aversion.
Case 3 : infP P(A) < ρ2(A) < ρ1(A) = supP P(A). Similar.
Case 4 : infP P(A) = ρ2(A) < ρ1(A) = supP P(A). Then there exists P ∈ co(P)
such that
ρ2(A) < P(A) < ρ1(A),
again contradicting the deﬁnition of imprecision aversion. 
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